CPI 2021 for Eastern Europe & Central Asia: Democratic hopes in the shadow of growing authoritarianism

With an average score of just 36 out of 100, Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the second lowest performing region in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).

In Central Asia, many political leaders used COVID-19 as a smokescreen to introduce new restrictions on rights and accountability during the last year, while populist governments in Eastern Europe have severely cracked down on the freedoms of expression and assembly needed to call out corruption. Across the region, authoritarian regimes spied on, intimidated and attacked activists, journalists, opposition leaders and ordinary citizens.

This year, only three countries from the region score above the global average of 43: Georgia (CPI score: 55), Armenia (49) and Montenegro (46). Belarus (41), once also above the average, dropped by 6 points since last year. Turkmenistan (19), Tajikistan (25) and Kyrgyzstan (27, down 4 points since last year) are the region’s worst performers.

Governments across the region have used COVID-19 as a pretext to further clamp down on critical voices, passing restrictive laws, suppressing free speech and access to information, and undermining judicial independence. Meanwhile, the Pegasus Project revealed the extensive digital surveillance suffered by journalists and human rights activists. These human rights violations have increased corruption risks, making it even more challenging to oversee how relief funds are spent and hold governments to account.

The government of Azerbaijan (30) targeted political opposition and government critics under the pretext of containing the pandemic. In Albania (35), journalists suffer lawsuits and intimidation, including excessive control of information related to COVID-19 responses. Moreover concerns over police violence during demonstrations and breaches of freedom of assembly have been registered throughout the pandemic.

The pandemic was also used as an excuse to reduce oversight and accountability for public procurement and foreign aid spending, allowing corruption to spread widely.

Kyrgyzstan (27), once known as an “island of democracy” in a region of autocracies, has used pandemic measures to obstruct the work of journalists and curtail freedom of assembly. Lack of transparency and reduced government oversight made it impossible to track COVID-19 relief funds and ensure that they went to the intended recipients.

Corruption undermines democratic rights and institutions by allowing corrupt leaders to use undemocratic practices to protect themselves from prosecution and increase their wealth. The Pandora Papers exposed, once again, how the use of offshore companies allows these ill-gotten assets to be laundered in the advanced economies that often top the CPI. Several countries in the region illustrate the deadly effects of corruption and authoritarianism.

Belarus’s decline from 47 points to 41 in the last year is no surprise, given the appalling clampdown on free speech and peaceful assembly witnessed in the country. The nationwide protests that broke out over 2020’s rigged presidential elections were met with unprecedented violence. Opposition candidates, their supporters, civil society activists and independent journalists were viciously suppressed and persecuted, while security forces arbitrarily arrested thousands of citizens. Democratic checks and balances have been dismantled or skewed in favour of the regime, letting grand corruption – where power is concentrated within and for the financial gain of political elites – run rife.

Meanwhile, Serbia (38) remains at its lowest score in a decade for the second year in a row. The country is no longer considered a democracy but a hybrid regime and its government has become notorious for heavily influencing the media, harassing independent critics and holding unfair elections. Lack of government transparency surrounding major foreign investments causes widespread concern, reflected by the recent wave of public protests against a controversial lithium exploitation project. The nationwide movement forced the president and his ruling Serbian Progressive Party to amend the new law on referendums and to withdraw legislation that would make it easier for the state to expropriate land.

Throughout the Western Balkans and in Turkey (38) a concentration of power in the hands of autocratic leaders and their parties has undermined judicial independence, which is helping to sustain this state capture.

Concentration of power is also a substantial concern in Georgia, which leads the region with a score of 55. The influence of the ruling party’s founder, formally retired Bidzina Ivanishvili, over key institutions meets the definition of state capture. His party, Georgian Dream, has in recent years solidified its grasp on the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, effectively killing the political momentum needed to fight corruption.

Kosovo (39) has seen peaceful transitions of power between governments over the last years. Its parliament was the only one in the Western Balkans – and one of only five in all of Europe – that did not transfer decision-making powers to the executive when the pandemic hit. The country showed a genuine will to fight corruption by investigating potentially corrupt leaders and adopting a strategy on rule of law. However, the government needs to ensure public appointments are timely, transparent and impartial to bring necessary improvements to public procurement processes.

After several years of decline, North Macedonia’s score (39) jumped by 4 points since last year. The country has taken steps to prosecute high-level officials for corruption and strengthen independent oversight institutions. The government also adopted an agenda and action plan against corruption – developed in consultation with civil society – which included explicit measures to fight organised crime, reform elections and the judicial system, and address nepotism, cronyism and influence in public hiring practices.

Following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Armenia (49) initially made both significant democratic improvements and positive strides against corruption, climbing 15 points on the CPI over the last decade. But despite progress, in 2021 promised anti-corruption and judicial reforms stalled in the wake of the political and economic crisis triggered by the pandemic and renewed conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

In Moldova (36, up 5 points since 2017), the parliamentary elections of July 2021 were met with optimism – the pro-European party, which campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, won the majority and formed a government led by two women. The government now needs to make good on its promises to de-politicise the anti-corruption bodies and genuinely reform the country’s justice system.

Uzbekistan (28) has been a steady improver on the CPI, gaining 11 points since 2012. The country is setting an example in Central Asia by showing some signs of democratisation and sanctioning corruption and abuse of power within government agencies. In recent years, the country undertook a number of key reforms in anti-corruption policies, identifying prevention as one of its priorities. Despite these positive changes, Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state with activists and civil society facing persecution, interrogation and dismissals.

The European Union accession process in the Western Balkans and Turkey – and potentially in some Eastern European countries in the future – offers an opportunity and many incentives to reverse the decline in the region.

However, governments in the region are ultimately responsible for fighting corruption and making the necessary reforms, including creating an environment where journalists and civil society can safely act as checks on abuses of power.

If not, corruption will continue to take hold, warping public decisions in favour of elites and siphoning public money away from critical services, like healthcare and education.